Usability and biometric verification at the ATM interface
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
A PIN-entry method resilient against shoulder surfing
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Spy-resistant keyboard: more secure password entry on public touch screen displays
OZCHI '05 Proceedings of the 17th Australia conference on Computer-Human Interaction: Citizens Online: Considerations for Today and the Future
Reducing shoulder-surfing by using gaze-based password entry
Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security
Undercover: authentication usable in front of prying eyes
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Towards understanding ATM security: a field study of real world ATM use
Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
Money on the move workload, usability and technology acceptance of second-screen atm-interactions
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Human-computer interaction with mobile devices and services
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More and more services are available on public terminals. Due to their public location and permanent availability, they can easily fall victim to manipulation. These manipulations mostly aim at stealing the customers' authentication information (e.g. bank card PIN) to gain access to the victims' possessions. By relocating the input from the terminal to the users' mobile device, the system presented in this paper makes the authentication process resistant against such manipulations. In principle, this relocation makes PIN entry more complex, with a tendency to worse usability. In this paper, we present the concept as well as an evaluation that has been conducted to study the trade off between usability and security. The results show that users apparently are willing to accept a certain increase of interaction time in exchange for improved security.