A behavioral study of bargaining in social networks
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The cooperative game theory foundations of network bargaining games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Local dynamics in bargaining networks via random-turn games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
An FPTAS for bargaining networks with unequal bargaining powers
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Fast convergence of natural bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Optimizing social welfare for network bargaining games in the face of unstability, greed and spite
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Bargaining for revenue shares on tree trading networks
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociologists. A Balanced Outcome for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and Tardos introduced balanced outcomes to the computer science community and provided a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the set of such outcomes. Their work left open a pertinent question: are there natural, local dynamics that converge quickly to a balanced outcome? In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question by showing that simple edge-balancing dynamics converge to a balanced outcome whenever one exists.