Trading networks with price-setting agents
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction
Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction
Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Convergence of Local Dynamics to Balanced Outcomes in Exchange Networks
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Auctions with intermediaries: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Monotonicity in bargaining networks
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Local dynamics in bargaining networks via random-turn games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
An FPTAS for bargaining networks with unequal bargaining powers
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
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We study trade networks with a tree structure, where a seller with a single indivisible good is connected to buyers, each with some value for the good, via a unique path of intermediaries. Agents in the tree make multiplicative revenue share offers to their parent nodes, who choose the best offer and offer part of it to their parent, and so on; the winning path is determined by who finally makes the highest offer to the seller. In this paper, we investigate how these revenue shares might be set via a natural bargaining process between agents on the tree, specifically, egalitarian bargaining between endpoints of each edge in the tree. We investigate the fixed point of this system of bargaining equations and prove various desirable for this solution concept, including (i) existence, (ii) uniqueness, (iii) efficiency, (iv) membership in the core, (v) strict monotonicity, (vi) polynomial-time computability to any given accuracy. Finally, we present numerical evidence that asynchronous dynamics with randomly ordered updates always converges to the fixed point, indicating that the fixed point shares might arise from decentralized bargaining amongst agents on the trade network.