Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network

  • Authors:
  • Tanmoy Chakraborty;Michael Kearns

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania,;Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania,

  • Venue:
  • WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We study the concept of bargaining solutions, which has been studied extensively in two-party settings, in a generalized setting involving arbitrary number of players and bilateral trade agreements over a social network. We define bargaining solutions in this setting, and show the existence of such solutions on all networks under some natural assumptions on the utility functions of the players. We also investigate the influence of network structure on equilibrium in our model, and note that approximate solutions can be computed efficiently when the networks are trees of bounded degree and the parties have nice utility functions.