Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Improved distributed approximate matching
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Local, distributed weighted matching on general and wireless topologies
Proceedings of the fifth international workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Convergence of Local Dynamics to Balanced Outcomes in Exchange Networks
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Distributed fractional packing and maximum weighted b-matching via tail-recursive duality
DISC'09 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Distributed computing
Monotonicity in bargaining networks
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The cooperative game theory foundations of network bargaining games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Local dynamics in bargaining networks via random-turn games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
An FPTAS for bargaining networks with unequal bargaining powers
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Fast convergence of natural bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Max-Product for Maximum Weight Matching: Convergence, Correctness, and LP Duality
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Stable and balanced outcomes of network bargaining games have been investigated recently, but the existence of such outcomes requires that the linear program relaxation of a certain maximum matching problem has integral optimal solution. We propose an alternative model for network bargaining games in which each edge acts as a player, who proposes how to split the weight of the edge among the two incident nodes. Based on the proposals made by all edges, a selection process will return a set of accepted proposals, subject to node capacities. An edge receives a commission if its proposal is accepted. The social welfare can be measured by the weight of the matching returned. The node users, as opposed to being rational players as in previous works, exhibit two characteristics of human nature: greed and spite. We define these notions formally and show that the distributed protocol by Kanoria et. al can be modified to be run by the edge players such that the configuration of proposals will converge to a pure Nash Equilibrium, without the LP integrality gap assumption. Moreover, after the nodes have made their greedy and spiteful choices, the remaining ambiguous choices can be resolved in a way such that there exists a Nash Equilibrium that will not hurt the social welfare too much.