Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on formal methods in software practice
Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
The design and implementation of a certifying compiler
PLDI '98 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1998 conference on Programming language design and implementation
From system F to typed assembly language
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
From model checking to a temporal proof
SPIN '01 Proceedings of the 8th international SPIN workshop on Model checking of software
Synthesizing Monitors for Safety Properties
TACAS '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
The anchored version of the temporal framework
Linear Time, Branching Time and Partial Order in Logics and Models for Concurrency, School/Workshop
Temporal Logic for Proof-Carrying Code
CADE-18 Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Mobile resource guarantees for smart devices
CASSIS'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Construction and Analysis of Safe, Secure, and Interoperable Smart Devices
Efficient monitoring of ω-languages
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Proof obligations preserving compilation
FAST'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Secure untrusted binaries — provably!
FAST'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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We extend the range of security policies that can be guaranteed with proof carrying code from the classical type safety, control safety, memory safety, and space/time guarantees to more general security policies, such as general resource and access control. We do so by means of (1) a specification logic for security policies, which is the past-time fragment of LTL, and (2) a synthesis algorithm generating reference monitor code and accompanying proof objects from formulae of the specification logic. To evaluate the feasibility of our approach, we developed a prototype implementation producing proofs in Isabelle/HOL.