Proving tight security for Rabin-Williams signatures

  • Authors:
  • Daniel J. Bernstein

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, The University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

This paper proves "tight security in the random-oracle model relative to factorization" for the lowest-cost signature systems available today: every hash-generic signature-forging attack can be converted, with negligible loss of efficiency and effectiveness, into an algorithm to factor the public key. The most surprising system is the "fixed unstructured B-0 Rabin-williams" system, which has a tight security proof despite hashing unrandomized messages.