The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
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Multiple NonInteractive Zero Knowledge Proofs Under General Assumptions
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CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Defining Proofs of Knowledge
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
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FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier
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Fast and secure immunization against adaptive man-in-the-middle impersonation
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the limitations of universally composable two-party computation without set-up assumptions
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Algebraic geometric secret sharing schemes and secure multi-party computations over small fields
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Universally Composable Multiparty Computation with Partially Isolated Parties
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Zero-Knowledge Proofs with Witness Elimination
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
Essentially Optimal Universally Composable Oblivious Transfer
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
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Unconditional and composable security using a single stateful tamper-proof hardware token
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
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TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
On obfuscating programs with tamper-proof hardware
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Founding cryptography on tamper-proof hardware tokens
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Truly efficient string oblivious transfer using resettable tamper-proof tokens
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Multichannel protocols to prevent relay attacks
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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We consider proof of knowledge protocols where the cheating prover may communicate with some external adversarial environment during the run of the proof. Without additional setup assumptions, no witness hiding protocol can securely ensure that the prover knows a witness in this scenario. This is because the prover may just be forwarding messages between the environment and the verifier while the environment performs all the necessary computation. In this paper we consider an l-isolated prover, which is restricted to exchanging at most l bits of information with its environment. We introduce a new notion called l-isolated proofs of knowledge (l-IPoK). These protocols securely ensure that an l-isolated prover knows the witness. To prevent the above-mentioned attack, an l-IPoK protocol has to have communication complexity greater than l. We show that for any relation in NP and any value l, there is an l-IPoK protocol for that relation. In addition, the communication complexity of such a protocol only needs to be larger than l by a constant multiplicative factor.