On obfuscating programs with tamper-proof hardware

  • Authors:
  • Ning Ding;Dawu Gu

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

  • Venue:
  • Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

In recent years, theoretical cryptography community has focused on a fascinating research line of obfuscating programs (circuits). Loosely speaking, obfuscating a program P is to construct a new program which can preserve P's functionality, but its code is fully "unintelligent". No adversary can understand the obfuscated program or reverse-engineering it. In TCC'10, Goyal et al. showed how to obfuscate any circuit (program) with tamer-proof (stateless) hardware. In their construction, the hardware executes most computation and the software executes a few, and the software needs to interact with the hardware θ(z) times if the original circuit is of size z. Thus if a user wants to gain the outputs of the obfuscated circuit on different inputs, he cannot fast the computation by running multiple instances of the obfuscated circuit concurrently well. In this paper we propose an alternative construction of obfuscating circuits (programs) with tamper-proof hardware. The notable characters of our construction are that the required hardware is still universal in obfuscating circuits and that for a specific circuit the computation on the instantiated hardware is independent of the size of the circuit. When a user runs multiple instances of the obfuscated circuit with different inputs concurrently, the software and hardware have reasonable computation load and thus the entire computation can run almost in parallel and thus be fasten.