Universally Composable Multi-party Computation Using Tamper-Proof Hardware

  • Authors:
  • Jonathan Katz

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland,

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Protocols proven secure within the universal composability (UC) frameworksatisfy strong and desirable security properties. Unfortunately, it is known that within the "plain" model, secure computation of general functionalities without an honest majority is impossible. This has prompted researchers to propose various "setup assumptions" with which to augment the bare UC framework in order to bypass this severe negative result. Existing setup assumptions seem to inherently require sometrusted party (or parties) to initialize the setup in the real world.We propose a new setup assumption -- more along the lines of a physicalassumption regarding the existence of tamper-proof hardware -- which also suffices to circumvent the impossibility result mentioned above. We suggest this assumption as potentially leading to an approach that might alleviate the need for trusted parties, and compare our assumption to those proposed previously.