Several weak bit-commitments using seal-once tamper-evident devices

  • Authors:
  • Ioana Boureanu;Serge Vaudenay

  • Affiliations:
  • Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland;Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland

  • Venue:
  • ProvSec'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Provable Security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we construct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on the sender's side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations between several flavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end human verifiability.