Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
MOPS: an infrastructure for examining security properties of software
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Another Look at "Provable Security"
Journal of Cryptology
Universally Composable Multi-party Computation Using Tamper-Proof Hardware
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptographic Engineering
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Adaptive Cryptographic Access Control
Adaptive Cryptographic Access Control
Formal co-verification for soc design with colored petri net
ICESS'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Embedded Software and Systems
Universally composable password-based key exchange
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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Nowadays, cryptographic devices are widely used, so how to assess the security of them becomes a pivotal issue. There are two conventional ways to do this, by analyzing the underlying cryptographic protocols or by estimating if the devices meet standards such as FIPS 140-2 or Common Criteria Standard Documents. However, neither of them provides a comprehensive view of the security of the devices. In this paper, we first propose a bottom-up method to prove the UC (Universally Composable) security of the cryptographic devices composed by hardware, software and protocols, and give a general security framework of them. Base on the framework, we present a method that describes the local physical security of cryptographic SoC hardware as UC security. Then we establish the equivalence of software codes and the real-world models in the condition of "Exactly Realize", which illustrate the UC security of software. Besides, we propose methods to construct UC secure cryptographic modules from UC secure cryptographic SoC and a further method to construct UC secure cryptographic devices. Furthermore, based on the idea of bottom-up, we can develop new UC secure cryptographic devices which are more powerful by the combination of the existed UC secure cryptographic devices.