Secure cryptographic precomputation with insecure memory

  • Authors:
  • Patrick P. Tsang;Sean W. Smith

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH;Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH

  • Venue:
  • ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We propose a solution that provides secure storage for cryptographic precomputation using insecure memory that is susceptible to eavesdropping and tampering. Specifically, we design a small tamper-resistant hardware module, the Queue Security Proxy (QSP), that situates transparently on the data-path between the processor and the insecure memory. Our analysis shows that our design is secure and flexible, and yet efficient and inexpensive. In particular, both the timing overhead and the hardware cost of our solution are independent of the storage size.