Analysis of Zipper as a hash function

  • Authors:
  • Pin Lin;Wenling Wu;Chuankun Wu;Tian Qiu

  • Affiliations:
  • The State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences;The State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences;The State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences;National Key Laboratory of Integrated Information System Technology, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences

  • Venue:
  • ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

At CRYPTO 2005, Coron etc. proposed several modified methods to make the usual hash functions based on MD method indifferentiable from random oracles. However, the compression functions used in Coron's schemes are supposed to be random oracles. This assumption is too strong. To achieve Coron's goal in the real world, Liskov proposed Zipper structure and implemented a new scheme indifferentiable from random oracle based on this structure. Unlike Coron's schemes, the indifferentiability of Liskov's scheme does not depend on strong compression functions and insecure compression functions can be used to implement Liskov's scheme. In this paper, we show that the security of Liskov's scheme is not ideal as a hash function. We also analyze those Zipper schemes whose compression functions are insecure PGV compression functions instead of Liskov's weak compression functions, and we find that some insecure PGV compression functions whose security is stronger than Liskov's weak compression function cannot be used to build indifferentiable and collision-resistant Zipper schemes.