Chord: a scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
NeuroGrid: Semantically Routing Queries in Peer-to-Peer Networks
Revised Papers from the NETWORKING 2002 Workshops on Web Engineering and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Deconstructing the Kazaa Network
WIAPP '03 Proceedings of the The Third IEEE Workshop on Internet Applications
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Denial-of-service resilience in peer-to-peer file sharing systems
SIGMETRICS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
Anomalous system call detection
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards Automatic Generation of Vulnerability-Based Signatures
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fluid modeling of pollution proliferation in P2P networks
SIGMETRICS '06/Performance '06 Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Malware prevalence in the KaZaA file-sharing network
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
A first look at peer-to-peer worms: threats and defenses
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
A novel contagion-like patch dissemination mechanism against peer-to-peer file-sharing worms
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
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File-sharing worms have been terrorizing Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems in recent years. Existing defenses relying on users' individual recoveries or limiting users' file-sharing activities are ineffective. Automated patching tools such as Microsoft Windows Update and Symantec Security Update are currently the most popular vehicles for eliminating and containing Internet worms, but they are not necessarily the best fits for combating P2P file-sharing worms, which propagate within a relatively smaller community. In this paper, we propose a complementary P2P-tailored patching system which utilizes the existing file-sharing mechanisms to internally disseminate security patches to those participating peers in a timely and distributed fashion. Specifically, we examine the effectiveness of leveraging the file downloading or searching process to notify vulnerable end hosts of the surging worms and push corresponding security updates to these hosts. We show through in-depth analysis and extensive experiments that both methods are scalable and effective in combating existing P2P worms.