How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Measurement, modeling, and analysis of a peer-to-peer file-sharing workload
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Design space and analysis of worm defense strategies
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Malware prevalence in the KaZaA file-sharing network
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Characterizing unstructured overlay topologies in modern P2P file-sharing systems
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the effectiveness of internal patching against file-sharing worms
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing worms are becoming a deadly security threat to P2P systems. The defense that just relies on the improvement of users' security awareness and their individual recoveries is not adequate. Existing automated patching systems such as Microsoft Windows Update and Symantec Security Update are also not necessarily the best fits in combat with P2P file-sharing worms, because of the inconsistency between the jurisdiction of these patching systems and the propagation community of P2P file-sharing worms. In this paper, with a deep understanding of the propagation characteristic of P2P file-sharing worms and the inspiration of more rapid contagion worms, we propose a complementary contagion-like patch dissemination mechanism which utilizes the existing file-sharing infrastructure to timely disseminate security patches between the participating peers of the file downloading. In addition, the digital signature scheme is introduced to prevent malicious peers tampering with patches in the dissemination process. Through the epidemiological model and extensive packet-level simulations we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed patch dissemination mechanism.