“Sometimes” and “not never” revisited: on branching versus linear time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM) - The MIT Press scientific computation series
Introduction to many-sorted logic
Many-sorted logic and its applications
Deontic logic: a concise overview
Deontic logic in computer science
On the characterization of law and computer systems: the normative systems perspective
Deontic logic in computer science
Model checking
Formalization of a voting protocol for virtual organizations
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Agent communication and artificial institutions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Symbolic model checking of institutions
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Specifying and enforcing norms in artificial institutions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
On the logic of normative systems
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
A protocol for resource sharing in norm-governed ad hoc networks
DALT'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies
The deontic component of action language n C+
DEON'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Deontic Logic and Artificial Normative Systems
Abstract Requirement Analysis in Multiagent System Design
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
On the multimodal logic of normative systems
COIN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Coordination, organizations, institutions, and norms in agent systems III
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In this paper we enrich FIEVeL (a modelling language for institutions amenable to model checking) with new constructs to describe norms and sanctions. Moreover, we present a specification language to reason about the effectiveness of norms and sanctions in shaping agent interactions. Finally we show that when properties of artificial institutions reflect certain interpretations of norms of human institutions, it is not always possible to satisfy them. As a consequence, regimentation of norms is not always a viable solution.