A new approach to service provisioning in ATM networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Computer Networks and ISDN Systems
Optimal pricing for integrated services networks
Internet economics
Resource allocation in multi-service networks via pricing: statistical multiplexing
Computer Networks and ISDN Systems - Special issue: trends in formal description techniques
Bandwidth Allocation By Pricing In ATM Networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6 Second International Conference on Broadband Communications II
Measurement-Based Usage Charges in Comminucations Networks
Operations Research
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Congestion control for fair resource allocation in networks with multicast flows
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Convex Optimization
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
An approach to service provisioning with quality of service requirements in ATM networks
Journal of High Speed Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Connection establishment in high-speed networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider the decentralized bandwidth/rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form that has the following desirable features. (1) It implements in Nash equilibria the solution of the corresponding centralized rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning. (2) It is individually rational. (3) It is budget-balanced at all Nash equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism/game form as well as off equilibrium. When the utilities of the users are quasi-concave the mechanism possesses properties (2) and (3) stated above. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the proposed mechanism results in a Walrasian equilibrium. We provide an intuitive interpretation of the mechanism, and discuss problems that need further investigation.