VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals

Authors:
Sichao Yang;B. Hajek
Affiliations:
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL;-
Venue:
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Year:
2007

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Abstract

rdquoThe VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one- dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions.