A new approach to service provisioning in ATM networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A new strategy for bidding in the network-wide progressive second price auction for bandwidth
CoNEXT '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM conference on Emerging network experiment and technology
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Federation of virtualized infrastructures: sharing the value of diversity
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
Multi-stage sequential uniform price auction mechanism for divisible goods
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Fair allocation of multiple resources using a non-monetary allocation mechanism
AIMS'13 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP WG 6.6 international conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management, and Security: emerging management mechanisms for the future internet - Volume 7943
Best upgrade plans for large road networks
SSTD'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Advances in Spatial and Temporal Databases
Hi-index | 22.15 |
We propose a mechanism for auctioning bundles of multiple divisible goods in a network where buyers want the same amount of bandwidth on each link in their route. Buyers can specify multiple routes (corresponding to a source-destination pair). The total flow can then be split among these multiple routes. We first propose a one-sided VCG-type mechanism. Players do not report a full valuation function but only a two-dimensional bid signal: the maximum quantity that they want and the per-unit price they are willing to pay. The proposed mechanism is a weak Nash implementation, i.e., it has a non-unique Nash equilibrium that implements the social-welfare maximizing allocation. We show the existence of an efficient Nash equilibrium in the corresponding auction game, though there may exist other Nash equilibria that are not efficient. We then generalize this to arbitrary bundles of various goods. Each buyer submits a bid separately for each good but their utility function is a general function of allocations of bundles of various divisible goods. We then present a double-sided auction mechanism for multiple divisible goods. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium of this auction game which yields the efficient allocation with strong budget balance.