Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games

Authors:
Joshua Letchford;Vincent Conitzer
Affiliations:
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA;Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Computing optimal strategies to commit to in general normal-form or Bayesian games is a topic that has recently been gaining attention, in part due to the application of such algorithms in various security and law enforcement scenarios. In this paper, we extend this line of work to the more general case of commitment in extensive-form games. We show that in some cases, the optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time; in others, computing it is NP-hard.