Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
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Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Quality-bounded solutions for finite Bayesian Stackelberg games: scaling up
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
PROTECT: a deployed game theoretic system to protect the ports of the United States
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
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Significant recent progress has been made in both the computation of optimal strategies to commit to (Stackelberg strategies), and the computation of correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this letter we discuss some recent results in the intersection of these two areas. We investigate how valuable commitment can be in stochastic games and give a brief summary of complexity results about computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.