The directional attack on wireless localization: how to spoof your location with a tin can

  • Authors:
  • Kevin Bauer;Damon McCoy;Eric Anderson;Markus Breitenbach;Greg Grudic;Dirk Grunwald;Douglas Sicker

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Colorado, Boulder, CO;University of Colorado, Boulder, CO;University of Colorado, Boulder, CO;University of Colorado, Boulder, CO;University of Colorado, Boulder, CO;University of Colorado, Boulder, CO;University of Colorado, Boulder, CO

  • Venue:
  • GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

802.11 localization algorithms provide the ability to accurately position and track wireless clients thereby enabling location-based services and applications. However, we show that these localization techniques are vulnerable to noncryptographic attacks where an adversary uses a low-cost directional antenna to appear from the localization algorithm's perspective to be in another arbitrary location of their choosing. The attacker's ability to actively influence where they are positioned is a key distinguishing feature of the directional attack relative to prior localization attacks that use transmit power control to introduce localization errors. We implement a representative set of received signal strength-based localization algorithms and evaluate the attack in a real office building environment. To mitigate the attack's effectiveness, we develop and evaluate an attack detection scheme that offers a high detection rate with few false positives.