Convex Optimization
Dynamic Key-Updating: Privacy-Preserving Authentication for RFID Systems
PERCOM '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Mining Frequent Trajectory Patterns for Activity Monitoring Using Radio Frequency Tag Arrays
PERCOM '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Stackelberg game for utility-based cooperative cognitiveradio networks
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
IEEE Transactions on Communications
On the achievable diversity-multiplexing tradeoff in half-duplex cooperative channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Coalitions in Cooperative Wireless Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper we exploit a setting for cognitive radio networks by utilizing cooperation from secondary users (SUs) to assist the transmissions of operators' primary users (PUs). On the other hand, SUs can share the spare spectrum of operators. Such a scenario can be viewed as a market where multiple operators trade their spare spectrum for the assistance of SUs, and multiple SUs trade the transmission energy for access opportunities from operators. We model the system using transferable payoff coalitional game theory. An outcome of a coalitional game is a specification of the coalition that forms and the joint action it takes. We show that the optimum joint action strategy can be obtained as a solution of convex optimization problem. Then, based on dual technique, we show that there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators and SUs while providing each player a share such that no subset of operators and SUs has an incentive to break away from the brand coalition.