Provider-customer coalitional games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
A decentralized framework for dynamic downlink base station cooperation
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Distributed relay-source matching for cooperative wireless networks using two-sided market games
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
A coalitional game model for cooperative cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the 6th International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference
Bandwidth exchange: an energy conserving incentive mechanism for cooperation
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Evolutionary network formation games and fuzzy coalition in heterogeneous networks
WD'09 Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP conference on Wireless days
IEEE Transactions on Communications
Selfish users in energy constrained ALOHA systems with power capture
Wireless Networks
Throughput-efficient dynamic coalition formation in distributed cognitive radio networks
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Provider-customer coalitional games
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Cooperative profit sharing in coalition-based resource allocation in wireless networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Dynamic pricing coalitional game for cognitive radio networks
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Networking
Pareto Optimal Allocation in Multi-agent Coalitional Games with Non-linear Payoffs
ASONAM '12 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2012)
A fair cooperative content-sharing service
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Distributed Matching Schemes for Multi-source and Multi-relay Cooperative Wireless Networks
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
Hi-index | 0.07 |
Cooperation between rational users in wireless networks is studied using coalitional game theory. Using the rate achieved by a user as its utility, it is shown that the stable coalition structure, i.e., set of coalitions from which users have no incentives to defect, depends on the manner in which the rate gains are apportioned among the cooperating users. Specifically, the stability of the grand coalition (GC), i.e., the coalition of all users, is studied. Transmitter and receiver cooperation in an interference channel (IC) are studied as illustrative cooperative models to determine the stable coalitions for both flexible (transferable) and fixed (non-transferable) apportioning schemes. It is shown that the stable sum-rate optimal coalition when only receivers cooperate by jointly decoding (transferable) is the GC. The stability of the GC depends on the detector when receivers cooperate using linear multiuser detectors (non-transferable). Transmitter cooperation is studied assuming that all receivers cooperate perfectly and that users outside a coalition act as jammers. The stability of the GC is studied for both the case of perfectly cooperating transmitters (transferrable) and under a partial decode-and-forward strategy (non-transferable). In both cases, the stability is shown to depend on the channel gains and the transmitter jamming strengths.