Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A network pricing game for selfish traffic
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Multihoming of Users to Access Points in WLANs: A Population Game Perspective
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A Game-Theoretic Model for Dynamic Pricing and Competition among Cloud Providers
UCC '13 Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM 6th International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing
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With the rapid development of wireless Internet services, several WLAN service providers may coexist in one public hotspot to compete for the same group of customers, leading to an inevitable price competition. The charged price and the provisioned packet loss at each provider are major factors in determining users' demands and behaviors, which in turn will affect providers' revenue and social welfare. In this paper, we set up a novel game model to analyze a duopoly price competition. We first show the users' demands are distributed between providers according to a Wardrop Equilibrium and then prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium on providers' charged prices. Through analysis, we further find that in Nash equilibrium state the social welfare is very close to its maximal value in cooperative situation. Furthermore, the providers' aggregate revenues also do not decrease when the users have high sensitivity about the charged prices. Thus the competitive duopoly WLAN market can still run in an efficient way even in the absence of complex regulation schemes.