CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Attack Resistant Cryptosystem Design: A Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Switching Approach
Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 3
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against side-channel key recovery
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
A side-channel analysis resistant description of the AES s-box
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Successfully attacking masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Masked dual-rail pre-charge logic: DPA-resistance without routing constraints
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
An AES smart card implementation resistant to power analysis attacks
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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In CRYPTO 2008, it has been shown that power-analysis attacks can completely break real-word remote keyless entry (RKE) systems based on the KEELOQ code-hopping scheme. A successful key-recovery involves a couple of security and privacy risks for the consumers as well as for the manufacturers. In this paper, we introduce a new RKE system that is inherently resistant against side-channel attacks, independent of the implementation platform. For our approach, a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) as introduced in ASIACCS 2008 is extended to prevent template attacks, and embedded into a secure remote-control application. We verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme by implementing it on a microcontroller and evaluate its physical security, thereby demonstrating that a practical key-recovery by means of power-analysis is not feasible.