Optimization flow control—I: basic algorithm and convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
DARWIN: distributed and adaptive reputation mechanism for wireless ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Dandelion: cooperative content distribution with robust incentives
ATC'07 2007 USENIX Annual Technical Conference on Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
CoNEXT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 ACM CoNEXT conference
Challenges, design and analysis of a large-scale p2p-vod system
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
The design trade-offs of BitTorrent-like file sharing protocols
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Embedding incentive mechanisms into network applications is becoming more important since they encourage nodes, either end hosts or routers, to cooperate so as to provide a high performance and scalable service. In this paper, we consider a new approach of using contracts to encourage and maintain cooperation. We formally define the notion of contract in a network setting and illustrate how contracts can be applied to P2P-VoD systems and ISP networks. We also formally show under what conditions a balanced and stable contract can be formaed so that all parties involved will have the incentive to honor the contract. We then propose both centralized and distributed algorithms to find and implement a stable and balanced contract with fairness and security properties. The algorithms can serve as a new genre of incentive mechanisms which are robust against collusion and Sybil attacks.