Combinatorial optimization: algorithms and complexity
Combinatorial optimization: algorithms and complexity
Characterizing finite Kripke structures in propositional temporal logic
Theoretical Computer Science - International Joint Conference on Theory and Practice of Software Development, P
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Institutions with a hierarchy of authorities in distributed dynamic environments
Artificial Intelligence and Law
On the logic of normative systems
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On the synthesis of useful social laws for artificial agent societies
AAAI'92 Proceedings of the tenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Delegation of power in normative multiagent systems
DEON'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Deontic Logic and Artificial Normative Systems
The deontic component of action language n C+
DEON'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Deontic Logic and Artificial Normative Systems
Learning from experience to generate new regulations
COIN@AAMAS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Coordination, organizations, institutions, and norms in agent systems
A framework for coalitional normative systems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Evaluation of an automated mechanism for generating new regulations
CAEPIA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Advances in artificial intelligence: spanish association for artificial intelligence
Using experience to generate new regulations
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Automated synthesis of normative systems
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Social laws have proved to be a powerful and theoretically elegant framework for coordination in multi-agent systems. Most existing models of social laws assume that a designer is attempting to produce a set of constraints on agent behaviour which will ensure that some single overall desirable objective is achieved. However, this represents a gross simplification of the typical situation, where a designer may have multiple (possibly conflicting) objectives, with different priorities. Moreover, social laws, as well as bringing benefits, also have implementation costs: imposing a social law often cannot be done at zero cost. We present a model of social laws that reflects this reality: it takes into account both the fact that the designer of a social law may have multiple differently valued objectives, and that the implementation of a social law is not costneutral. In this setting, designing a social law becomes an optimisation problem, in which a designer must take into account both the benefits and costs of a social law. We investigate the issue of representing a designer's objectives, characterise the complexity of the optimal social law design problem, and consider possible constraints that lead to reductions in computational complexity. We then show how the problem of designing an optimal social law can be formulated as an integer linear program.