Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Denial of Service in Sensor Networks
Computer
TOSSIM: accurate and scalable simulation of entire TinyOS applications
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Security in wireless sensor networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless sensor networks
TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Distributed Detection of Node Replication Attacks in Sensor Networks
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ECC Hardware Coprocessors for 8-bit Systems and Power Consumption Considerations
ITNG '06 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations
Design and Implementation of Low-Area and Low-Power AES Encryption Hardware Core
DSD '06 Proceedings of the 9th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design
How public key cryptography influences wireless sensor node lifetime
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
TinyECC: A Configurable Library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Wireless Sensor Networks
IPSN '08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information processing in sensor networks
Secure neighborhood discovery: a fundamental element for mobile ad hoc networking
IEEE Communications Magazine
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Due to their limited capabilities, wireless sensor nodes are subject to physical attacks that are hard to defend against. In this paper, we first identify a typical attacker, called parasitic adversary, who seeks to exploit sensor networks by obtaining measurements in an unauthorized way. As a countermeasure, we first employ a randomized key refreshing: with low communication cost, it aims at confining (but not eliminating) the effects of the adversary. Moreover, our low-complexity solution, GossiCrypt, leverages on the large scale of sensor networks to protect data confidentiality, efficiently and effectively. GossiCrypt applies symmetric key encryption to data at their source nodes; and it applies re-encryption at a randomly chosen subset of nodes en route to the sink. The combination of randomized key refreshing and GossiCrypt protects data confidentiality with a probability of almost 1; we show this analytically and with simulations. In addition, the energy consumption of GossiCrypt is lower than a public-key based solution by several orders of magnitude.