Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning
Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning
Representations of commonsense knowledge
Representations of commonsense knowledge
A simple solution to the Yale shooting problem
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
A practical nonmonotonic theory for reasoning about speech acts
ACL '88 Proceedings of the 26th annual meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics
On the relation between default theories and autoepistemic logic
IJCAI'87 Proceedings of the 10th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Formal theories of action (preliminary report)
IJCAI'87 Proceedings of the 10th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Artificial Intelligence
Speculative constraint processing for hierarchical agents
AI Communications - European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS) 2009
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This paper presents a formal theory of multiple agent non-monotonic reasoning. We introduce the subject of multiple agent non-monotonic reasoning for inquiry and motivate the field in terms of its applications for commonsense reasoning. We extend Moore's [1985] Autoepistemic Logic to the multiple agent case, and show that the resulting logic is too weak for most applications of commonsense reasoning. We then suggest some possible sets of principles for a logic of multipleagent non-monotonic reasoning, based on the concept of an agent's arrogance towards his knowledge of another agent's ignorance. While the principles of arrogance are in general too strong, we demonstrate that restricted versions of these principles can work quite well for commonsense reasoning. In particular, we show that a restricted form of the principle of arrogance yields results that are equivalent to EMAT [Morgenstern, 1989], a non-monotonic logic which was designed to reason about temporal projection in epistemic contexts.