Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: A New Concept
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
A New Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Can We Eliminate Certificate Revocations Lists?
FC '98 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Multi-signatures in the plain public-Key model and a general forking lemma
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A method for fast revocation of public key certificates and security capabilities
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Remote timing attacks are practical
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Certificate revocation and certificate update
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Secure software updates: disappointments and new challenges
HOTSEC'06 Proceedings of the 1st USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security
A look in the mirror: attacks on package managers
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical threshold signatures
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Unicorn: two-factor attestation for data security
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices
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Today's software update systems have little or no defense against key compromise. As a result, key compromises have put millions of software update clients at risk. Here we identify three classes of information whose authenticity and integrity are critical for secure software updates. Analyzing existing software update systems with our framework, we find their ability to communicate this information securely in the event of a key compromise to be weak or nonexistent. We also find that the security problems in current software update systems are compounded by inadequate trust revocation mechanisms. We identify core security principles that allow software update systems to survive key compromise. Using these ideas, we design and implement TUF, a software update framework that increases resilience to key compromise.