How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical and Provably Secure Coalition-Resistant Group Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Group signatures with verifier-local revocation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Enhanced privacy id: a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Blacklistable anonymous credentials: blocking misbehaving users without ttps
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Universal Accumulators with Efficient Nonmembership Proofs
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
PEREA: towards practical TTP-free revocation in anonymous authentication
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Nymble: anonymous IP-address blocking
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Nymble: Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymizing Networks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Accumulators from bilinear pairings and applications
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
PEREA: Practical TTP-free revocation of repeatedly misbehaving anonymous users
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
FAUST: efficient, TTP-free abuse prevention by anonymous whitelisting
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
BNymble: more anonymous blacklisting at almost no cost (a short paper)
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Opaak: using mobile phones to limit anonymous identities online
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
PERM: practical reputation-based blacklisting without TTPS
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Thinking inside the BLAC box: smarter protocols for faster anonymous blacklisting
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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Anonymous blacklisting schemes enable online service providers to block future accesses from abusive users behind anonymizing networks, such as Tor, while preserving the privacy of all users, both abusive and non-abusive. Several such schemes exist in the literature, but all suffer from one of several faults: they rely on trusted parties that can collude to de-anonymize users, they scale poorly with the number of blacklisted users, or they place a very high computational load on the trusted parties. We introduce Jack, an efficient, scalable anonymous blacklisting scheme based on cryptographic accumulators. Compared to the previous efficient schemes, Jack significantly reduces the communication and computation costs required of trusted parties while also weakening the trust placed in these parties. Compared with schemes with no trusted parties, Jack enjoys constant scaling with respect to the number of blacklisted users, imposing dramatically reduced computation and communication costs for service providers. Jack is provably secure in the random oracle model, and we demonstrate its efficiency both analytically and experimentally.