Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Enhanced privacy id: a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Blacklistable anonymous credentials: blocking misbehaving users without ttps
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PEREA: towards practical TTP-free revocation in anonymous authentication
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Nymble: anonymous IP-address blocking
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Jack: scalable accumulator-based nymble system
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Nymble: Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymizing Networks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
FAUST: efficient, TTP-free abuse prevention by anonymous whitelisting
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Thinking inside the BLAC box: smarter protocols for faster anonymous blacklisting
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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Anonymous blacklisting schemes allow online service providers to prevent future anonymous access by abusive users while preserving the privacy of all anonymous users (both abusive and non-abusive). The first scheme proposed for this purpose was Nymble, an extremely efficient scheme based only on symmetric primitives; however, Nymble relies on trusted third parties who can collude to de-anonymize users of the scheme. Two recently proposed schemes, Nymbler and Jack, reduce the trust placed in these third parties at the expense of using less-efficient asymmetric crypto primitives. We present BNymble, a scheme which matches the anonymity guarantees of Nymbler and Jack while (nearly) maintaining the efficiency of the original Nymble. The key insight of BNymble is that we can achieve the anonymity goals of these more recent schemes by replacing only the infrequent "User Registration" protocol from Nymble with asymmetric primitives. We prove the security of BNymble, and report on its efficiency.