Randomized algorithms
Selective families, superimposed codes, and broadcasting on unknown radio networks
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Protecting Free Expression Online with Freenet
IEEE Internet Computing
Deterministic Superimposed Coding with Applications to Pattern Matching
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Information Revolution and Global Politics)
Weighted superimposed codes and constrained integer compressed sensing
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Algorithmica - Including a Special Section on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation; Guest Editors: Benjamin Doerr, Frank Neumann and Ingo Wegener
Fighting censorship with algorithms
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students - Computer Science in Service of Democracy
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proximax: measurement-driven proxy dissemination (short paper)
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Strategic formation of credit networks
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
CensorSpoofer: asymmetric communication using IP spoofing for censorship-resistant web browsing
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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In countries such as China or Iran where Internet censorship is prevalent, users usually rely on proxies or anonymizers to freely access the web. The obvious difficulty with this approach is that once the address of a proxy or an anonymizer is announced for use to the public, the authorities can easily filter all traffic to that address. This poses a challenge as to how proxy addresses can be announced to users without leaking too much information to the censorship authorities. In this paper, we formulate this question as an interesting algorithmic problem. We study this problem in a static and a dynamic model, and give almost tight bounds on the number of proxy servers required to give access to n people k of whom are adversaries. We will also discuss how trust networks can be used in this context.