Semi-invasive EM attack on FPGA RO PUFs and countermeasures
WESS '11 Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Localized electromagnetic analysis of cryptographic implementations
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
Side channel attacks and the non volatile memory of the future
Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Compilers, architectures and synthesis for embedded systems
Attacking RSA---CRT signatures with faults on montgomery multiplication
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Secure multipliers resilient to strong fault-injection attacks using multilinear arithmetic codes
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
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This paper introduces some new types of optical fault attacks called fault masking attacks. These attacks are aimed at disrupting of the normal memory operation through preventing changes of the memory contents. The technique was demonstrated on an EEPROM and Flash memory inside PIC microcontrollers. Then it was improved with a backside approach and tested on a PIC and MSP430microcontrollers. These attacks can be used for the partial reverse engineering of semiconductor chips by spotting the areas of activity in reprogrammable non-volatile memory. This can assist in data analysis and other types of fault injection attacks later, thereby saving the time otherwise required for exhaustive search. Practical limits for optical fault masking attacks in terms of sample preparation, operating conditions and chip technology are discussed, together with possible countermeasures.