Convex Optimization
Resource Allocation for Wireless Networks: Basics, Techniques, and Applications
Resource Allocation for Wireless Networks: Basics, Techniques, and Applications
Mutual information games in multiuser channels with correlated jamming
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure space-time communication
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Correlated jamming on MIMO Gaussian fading channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure Communication Over Fading Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
The Relay–Eavesdropper Channel: Cooperation for Secrecy
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the Secrecy Capacity of Fading Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Non-Atomic Games for Multi-User Systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Improving wireless physical layer security via cooperating relays
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Distributed Coalition Formation Games for Secure Wireless Transmission
Mobile Networks and Applications
Power allocation in team jamming games in wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Optimization schemes for protective jamming
Proceedings of the thirteenth ACM international symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
Optimization Schemes for Protective Jamming
Mobile Networks and Applications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Physical layer security is an emerging security area that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between intended network nodes, while malicious nodes that eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdroppers. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the useful data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "masking" the eavesdropper. To obtain distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined such that the source pays the jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, therefore, increasing the secrecy capacity. The friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for the jamming, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we investigate a Stackelburg type of game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The distributed game solution is shown to have similar performances to those of the centralized one.