Optimal attack and reinforcement of a network
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Discrete Mathematics
An Õ(n2) algorithm for minimum cuts
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Combinatorial optimization: packing and covering
Combinatorial optimization: packing and covering
Convex Optimization
Approximation via cost sharing: Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A jamming-resistant MAC protocol for single-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Design of network topology in an adversarial environment
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
Design of network topology in an adversarial environment
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
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We study the strategic interaction between a network manager whose goal is to choose (as communication infrastructure) a spanning tree of a network given as an undirected graph, and an attacker who is capable of attacking a link in the network. We model their interaction as a zero-sum game and discuss a particular set of Nash equilibria. More specifically, we show that there always exists a Nash equilibrium under which the attacker targets a critical set of links. A set of links is called critical if it has maximum vulnerability, and the vulnerability of a set of links is defined as the minimum fraction of links the set has in common with a spanning tree. Using simple examples, we discuss the importance of critical subsets in the design of networks that are aimed to be robust against attackers. Finally, an algorithm is provided, to compute a critical subset of a given graph.