Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Convex Optimization
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Analysis of iterative waterfilling algorithm for multiuser power control in digital subscriber lines
EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing
Practical quantize-and-forward schemes for the frequency division relay channel
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
What happens when cognitive terminals compete for a relaying node?
ICASSP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
Power control game in protected and shared bands: manipulability of Nash equilibrium
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Spectrum sharing games on the interference channel
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Resource allocation games in interference relay channels
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Resource allocation in protected and shared bands: uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibria
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Iterative water-filling for Gaussian vector multiple-access channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Bounds on capacity and minimum energy-per-bit for AWGN relay channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where the two transmitters can exploit one common relay node to improve their individual transmission rate. Communications are assumed to be multiband, and transmitters are assumed to selfishly allocate their resources to optimize their individual transmission rate. The main objective of this paper is to show that this conflicting situation (modeled by a non-cooperative game) has some stable outcomes, namely, Nash equilibria. This result is proved for three different types of relaying protocols: decode-and-forward, estimate-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. We provide additional results on the problems of uniqueness, efficiency of the equilibrium, and convergence of a best-response-based dynamics to the equilibrium. These issues are analyzed in a special case of the amplify-and-forward protocol and illustrated by simulations in general.