Security applications: lessons of real-world deployment

Authors:
James Pita;Harish Bellamane;Manish Jain;Chris Kiekintveld;Jason Tsai;Fernando Ordóñez;Milind Tambe
Affiliations:
University of Southern California, CA;University of Southern California, CA;University of Southern California, CA;University of Southern California, CA;University of Southern California, CA;University of Southern California, CA;University of Southern California, CA
Venue:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Year:
2009

Citing 9
Cited 2

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to

EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium

FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Bayesian stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airport

ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games

Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Deployed ARMOR protection: the application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport

Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies

Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Effective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties

Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games

Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1

GUARDS and PROTECT: next generation applications of security games

ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

Game theory has played an important role in security decisions. Recent work using Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991] to model security domains has been particularly influential [Basilico et al. 2009; Kiekintveld et al. 2009; Paruchuri et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2009]. In a Stackelberg game, a leader (in this case the defender) acts first and commits to a randomized security policy. The follower (attacker) optimizes its reward considering the strategy chosen by the leader. These games are well-suited to representing the problem security forces face in allocating limited resources, such as officers, canine units, and checkpoints. In particular, the fact that the attacker is able to observe the policy reflects the way real terrorist organizations plan attacks using extensive surveillance and long planning cycles.