Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
SIAM Journal on Computing
Simulation and Gaming
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Effective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Competitive safety analysis: robust decision-making in multi-agent systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Security applications: lessons of real-world deployment
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Computing optimal strategy against quantal response in security games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Protecting location privacy: optimal strategy against localization attacks
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security games with interval uncertainty
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Game-theoretic question selection for tests
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
An ambiguity aversion framework of security games under ambiguities
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program deployed at LAX Airport and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational assumption for using Stackelberg games is that security forces (leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized strategy; while their adversaries (followers) choose their best response after surveillance of this randomized strategy. Yet, in many situations, a leader may face uncertainty about the follower's surveillance capability. Previous work fails to address how a leader should compute her strategy given such uncertainty. We provide five contributions in the context of a general class of security games. First, we show that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Second, under a natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third, when faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets, many of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, we show experimentally that in most (but not all) games where the restriction does not hold, the Stackelberg strategy is still a Nash equilibrium strategy, but this is no longer true when the attacker can attack multiple targets. Finally, as a possible direction for future research, we propose an extensive-form game model that makes the defender's uncertainty about the attacker's ability to observe explicit.