Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Effective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
GUARDS and PROTECT: next generation applications of security games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
GUARDS: game theoretic security allocation on a national scale
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing time-dependent policies for patrolling games with mobile targets
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Real-world security games: toward addressing human decision-making uncertainty
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Game theory and human behavior: challenges in security and sustainability
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multiagent Communication Security in Adversarial Settings
WI-IAT '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Security games with multiple attacker resources
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
GUARDS: innovative application of game theory for national airport security
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Solving non-zero sum multiagent network flow security games with attack costs
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A robust approach to addressing human adversaries in security games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Security scheduling for real-world networks
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Defender (mis)coordination in security games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Efficiently solving joint activity based security games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Scaling-up security games with boundedly rational adversaries: a cutting-plane approach
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model; for example, these games are at the heart of major applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational assumption for using Stackel-berg games is that security forces (leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized strategy; while their adversaries (followers) choose their best response after surveillance of this randomized strategy. Yet, in many situations, the followers may act without observation of the leader's strategy, essentially converting the game into a simultaneous-move game model. Previous work fails to address how a leader should compute her strategy given this fundamental uncertainty about the type of game faced. Focusing on the complex games that are directly inspired by real-world security applications, the paper provides four contributions in the context of a general class of security games. First, exploiting the structure of these security games, the paper shows that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Second, resolving the leader's dilemma, it shows that under a natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of real-world security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third, when faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets, many of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, our experimental results emphasize positive properties of games that do not fit our restrictions. Our contributions have major implications for the real-world applications.