Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Security in multiagent systems by policy randomization
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Adversarial uncertainty in multi-robot patrol
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
On events in multi-robot patrol in adversarial environments
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 2 - Volume 2
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
GUARDS and PROTECT: next generation applications of security games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Real-world security games: toward addressing human decision-making uncertainty
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Game theory and human behavior: challenges in security and sustainability
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Computing optimal strategy against quantal response in security games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A unified method for handling discrete and continuous uncertainty in Bayesian Stackelberg games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Game-theoretic resource allocation for malicious packet detection in computer networks
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Game theory for security: an important challenge for multiagent systems
EUMAS'11 Proceedings of the 9th European conference on Multi-Agent Systems
Optimal interdiction of attack plans
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Security games with interval uncertainty
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Building on research previously reported at AAMAS conferences, this paper describes an innovative application of a novel game-theoretic approach for a national scale security deployment. Working with the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA), we have developed a new application called GUARDS to assist in resource allocation tasks for airport protection at over 400 United States airports. In contrast with previous efforts such as ARMOR and IRIS, which focused on one-off tailored applications and one security activity (e.g. canine patrol or checkpoints) per application, GUARDS faces three key issues: (i) reasoning about hundreds of heterogeneous security activities; (ii) reasoning over diverse potential threats; (iii) developing a system designed for hundreds of end-users. Since a national deployment precludes tailoring to specific airports, our key ideas are: (i) creating a new game-theoretic framework that allows for heterogeneous defender activities and compact modeling of a large number of threats; (ii) developing an efficient solution technique based on general purpose Stackelberg game solvers; (iii) taking a partially centralized approach for knowledge acquisition and development of the system. In doing so we develop a software scheduling assistant, GUARDS, designed to reason over two agents --- the TSA and a potential adversary --- and allocate the TSA's limited resources across hundreds of security activities in order to provide protection within airports. The scheduling assistant has been delivered to the TSA and is currently under evaluation and testing for scheduling practices at an undisclosed airport. If successful, the TSA intends to incorporate the system into their unpredictable scheduling practices nation-wide. In this paper we discuss the design choices and challenges encountered during the implementation of GUARDS. GUARDS represents promising potential for transitioning years of academic research into a nationally deployed system.