Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Adversarial uncertainty in multi-robot patrol
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On events in multi-robot patrol in adversarial environments
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 2 - Volume 2
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned
Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned
Security games with multiple attacker resources
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
PROTECT: a deployed game theoretic system to protect the ports of the United States
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study security games with multiple defenders. To achieve maximum security, defenders must perfectly synchronize their randomized allocations of resources. However, in real-life scenarios (such as protection of the port of Boston) this is not the case. Our goal is to quantify the loss incurred by miscoordination between defenders, both theoretically and empirically. We introduce two notions that capture this loss under different assumptions: the price of miscoordination, and the price of sequential commitment. Generally speaking, our theoretical bounds indicate that the loss may be extremely high in the worst case, while our simulations establish a smaller yet significant loss in practice.