Run the GAMUT: A Comprehensive Approach to Evaluating Game-Theoretic Algorithms
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
GUARDS and PROTECT: next generation applications of security games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Security games with multiple attacker resources
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
PROTECT: a deployed game theoretic system to protect the ports of the United States
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Agents vs. pirates: multi-agent simulation and optimization to fight maritime piracy
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Game theory for security: an important challenge for multiagent systems
EUMAS'11 Proceedings of the 9th European conference on Multi-Agent Systems
Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Defender (mis)coordination in security games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Recent applications of game theory in security domains use algorithms to solve a Stackelberg model, in which one player (the leader) first commits to a mixed strategy and then the other player (the follower) observes that strategy and best-responds to it. However, in real-world applications, it is hard to determine whether the follower is actually able to observe the leader's mixed strategy before acting. In this paper, we model the uncertainty about whether the follower is able to observe the leader's strategy as part of the game (as proposed in the extended version of Yin et al. [17]). We describe an iterative algorithm for solving these games. This algorithm alternates between calling a Nash equilibrium solver and a Stackelberg solver as subroutines. We prove that the algorithm finds a solution in a finite number of steps and show empirically that it runs fast on games of reasonable size. We also discuss other properties of this methodology based on the experiments.