DSS design: a systemic view of decision support
Communications of the ACM
International Journal of Game Theory
A note about games-composition dimension
Discrete Applied Mathematics
An empirical investigation of decision-making satisfaction in web-based decision support systems
Decision Support Systems
Multi-Agent Simulation of Collaborative Strategies in a Supply Chain
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus
Decision Support Systems
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Binary voting systems, usually represented by simple games, constitute a main DSS topic. A crucial feature of such a system is the easiness with which a proposal can be collectively accepted, which is measured by the ''decisiveness index'' of the corresponding game. We study here several functions related to the decisiveness of any simple game. The analysis, including the asymptotic behavior as the number n of players increases, is restricted to decisive symmetric games and their compositions, and it is assumed that all players have a common probability p to vote for the proposal. We show that, for n large enough, a small variation, either positive or negative, in p when p=1/2 takes the decisiveness to quickly approach, respectively, 1 or 0. Moreover, we analyze the speed of the decisiveness convergence.