Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Exploring logical dynamics
First-order modal logic
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions
TARK '98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Knowledge and the logic of local propositions
TARK '98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Strategic argumentation: a game theoretical investigation
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
INAP'01 Proceedings of the Applications of prolog 14th international conference on Web knowledge management and decision support
Dialogue games in defeasible logic
AI'07 Proceedings of the 20th Australian joint conference on Advances in artificial intelligence
Twelve angry men: a study on the fine-grain of announcements
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
Dynamic epistemic temporal logic
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
On the logic of argumentation theory
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Becoming aware of propositional variables
ICLA'11 Proceedings of the 4th Indian conference on Logic and its applications
Strategic argumentation in rigorous persuasion dialogue
ArgMAS'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
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We model games where players strategically exchange messages in a language for reasoning and strategically update their reasoning. The language for the stage game incorporates awareness and knowledge and extends [14]'s propositional quantification to quantification over all sentences in the language. The updating of reasoning is modeled as a strategic choice of the players and the dynamics of the logic provide constraints for this strategic update choice. A communication game is constructed using an underlying incomplete information game, the strategic choice of messages and the strategic and logic dynamics. Multiple games are described varying by how the game theoretic type-space relates to the language for reasoning.