Strategical considerations for negotiating agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Modular Representation of Agent Interaction Rules through Argumentation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Formal systems for persuasion dialogue
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Strategic argumentation: a game theoretical investigation
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Mechanism design for abstract argumentation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Using enthymemes in an inquiry dialogue system
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
Heuristics in Argumentation: A Game-Theoretical Investigation
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2008
Specifying and implementing a persuasion dialogue game using commitments and arguments
ArgMAS'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Choosing persuasive arguments for action
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
ArgMAS'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
Case-based strategies for argumentation dialogues in agent societies
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Applied Computational Intelligence and Soft Computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Philosophical dialogue games have been used widely as models for protocols in multi-agent systems to improve flexibility, expressiveness, robustness and efficiency. However, many dialogue games are effectively based on propositional logic, which is not always sufficiently expressive for artificial reasoning. In particular they do not allow for a strong connection between computational models of dialogic argument and mature mathematical models of abstract argument structures, which support a range of sophisticated agent reasoning systems. In this paper we describe how an existing dialogue game — Walton & Krabbe's $\mathit{RPD}_{\mathit{0}}$ — may be adapted by using Dung Argumentation Frameworks in place of propositional logic. We call this new dialogue game $\mathit{RPD}_{\mathit{GD}}$, and describe some of its advantages over RPD0, chiefly (i) that it allows the proponent to win by exploiting not just defects in the opponent's reasoning or inconsistency in its knowledge base, but also the incompleteness of its knowledge; and (ii) that it thus provides wider scope for strategic sophistication in multi-agent dialogue. We make two linked observations relating to strategy in RPDGD dialogues — first, that there are minimal sets of beliefs that one agent must hold, in order to know (assuming the correctness of those beliefs) whether it can successfully persuade another; and second, that the would-be persuader may regulate its utterances, in order to avoid acquiring at least some of the information which is outside these minimal amounts and thus irrelevant. We consider these observations using the concepts Minimum Sufficient Contextual Knowledge (MSCK) and fortification respectively. We demonstrate that in even very simple situations a strategy informed by these concepts can mean the difference between winning and losing a given encounter.