Strategic argumentation: a game theoretical investigation

  • Authors:
  • Bram Roth;Régis Riveret;Antonino Rotolo;Guido Governatori

  • Affiliations:
  • Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy;Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy;Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy;University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
  • Year:
  • 2007

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.