AES variants secure against related-key differential and boomerang attacks

  • Authors:
  • Jiali Choy;Aileen Zhang;Khoongming Khoo;Matt Henricksen;Axel Poschmann

  • Affiliations:
  • DSO National Laboratories, Singapore;DSO National Laboratories, Singapore;DSO National Laboratories, Singapore;Institute for Infocomm Research, A*STAR, Singapore;Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
  • Year:
  • 2011
  • The LED block cipher

    CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a framework for protection against the recent related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES by Biryukov et al. Then we study an alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. at ACISP 2002 as a possible candidate to protect against these related key attacks. We find that there exist equivalent keys for this key schedule and in response, we propose an improvement to overcome this weakness. We proceed to prove, using our framework, that our improved May et al.'s key schedule is secure against relatedkey differential and boomerang attacks. Since May et al.'s key schedule is not on-the-fly (which is a requirement for some hardware implementations), we propose an on-the-fly AES key schedule that is resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.