New types of cryptanalytic attacks using related keys
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Strengthening the Key Schedule of the AES
ACISP '02 Proceedings of the 7th Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
A Compact Rijndael Hardware Architecture with S-Box Optimization
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
FSE '99 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
FSE '99 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Distinguisher and Related-Key Attack on the Full AES-256
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full AES-192 and AES-256
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient AES implementations on ASICs and FPGAs
AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
Related-Key boomerang and rectangle attacks
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
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In this paper, we present a framework for protection against the recent related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES by Biryukov et al. Then we study an alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. at ACISP 2002 as a possible candidate to protect against these related key attacks. We find that there exist equivalent keys for this key schedule and in response, we propose an improvement to overcome this weakness. We proceed to prove, using our framework, that our improved May et al.'s key schedule is secure against relatedkey differential and boomerang attacks. Since May et al.'s key schedule is not on-the-fly (which is a requirement for some hardware implementations), we propose an on-the-fly AES key schedule that is resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.